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1. Introduction
Although since the early 1890's the Dutch colonial government had already 
started a modest program of import-substituting industrialization as one of the 
ways to overcome the adverse impact of the Great Depression on the Indonesian 
economy, the development of a modern manufacturing sector in Indonesia only 
started in earnest from the late 1960's after the New Order Government under 
President Soeharto was able to achieve political stability after a tumultuous 
decade-and-a-half of political upheaval. To a large extent the rapid progress in 
industrial development which Indonesia has been able to achieve during the past 
two-and-a-half decades has been the outcome of a vast increase in new investment 
by both domestic as well as foreign investors that was spurred by the substantial 
improvement in the investment climate created by the New Order Government, 
and reflected by the promulgation of Foreign Investment Law in 1967 and a 
Domestic Investment Law in 1968. Both these laws offered new investors a host of 
incentives, including fiscal incentives and the right to transfer profit overseas. 
     Over the period since Indonesia opened its doors to foreign direct 
investment (FDI), Japan has, together with the United States, emerged as one of 
the two major source countries of FDI in Indonesia and, in fact, has become the 
major investing country in the manufacturing sector. As FDI constitutes the 
transfer of a package of capital, technology, managerial and organizational skill, 
and access to foreign markets from the source to the host country, Japanese FDI in
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Indonesia has also involved the transfer of industrial technology from Japan to 
Indonesia. Since Japanese companies are, as noted above, by far the major foreign 
investors in Indonesia's manufacturing sector, they therefore constitute also a 
major foreign source of industrial technology to Indonesia. 
     In addition to FDI, foreign industrial technology can also be acquired by 
Indonesian manufacturers through technical licensing agreements with foreign 
manufacturing companies. Through this unpackaged channel, Japanese industrial 
technology has over the years also been transferred to Indonesia. 
     Another source through which foreign industrial technology can be 
transferred from a developed to a developing country is through the foreign aid 
programs of these developed countries, specifically through the technical 
assistance programs. As Japan has, since the beginning of the New Order 
Government always been one of the major source countries of foreign aid to 
Indonesia and, in fact, over the past few years has emerged as by far the most 
important donor country, a significant part of Japanese industrial technology has 
also been transferred through Japan's technical assistance program to Indonesia. 
     Though Japan has been and will still remain a major source of industrial 
technology to Indonesia for many more years to come, no major study has yet 
been carried out on this important aspect of Indonesia's industrial development. 
This paper does not pretend to provide a comprehensive picture of the transfer of 
industrial technology from Japan to Indonesia. At most it will describe the various 
aspects of technology transfer from Japan to Indonesia and, wherever possible, 
will try to assess the relative significance of the various channels through which 
industrial technology has been transferred from Japan to Indonesia. More 
important, the issue will be to address the extent to which the transfer of Japanese 
technology to Indonesia has led to the acquisition of local industrial technological 
capability. Before doing so, however, we will first briefly discuss the role which 
Japan's foreign aid and foreign direct investment have played in Indonesia's 
industrial development. Subsequently, the various public and private channels 
will be described through which Japanese industrial technology has been 
transferred to Indonesia. The paper will conclude with a tentative assessment of 
the relative significance of this transfer of industrial technology from Japan to 
Indonesia.
2. Channels of International Technology Transfer
There are various ways in which international technology transfer can take place. 
In the private sector technology transfer can take place between firms through 
foreign direct investment (FDI) or through technical licensing agreements
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independent of equity investments. In the latter case the firm selling the 
technology (licensor) provides the firm purchasing the technology (the licensee) 
with a license to use the former's production technology and produce its products 
under the former's brand name. A technical licensing agreement can also involve 
the provision of technical assistance in a less formal way by overseas suppliers of 
equipment, raw materials, and finance. A similar technology transfer can can also 
take place between public sector enterprises (Hill & Johns 1983: 61-62). 
     Technology can also be transferred through the technical assistance 
programs of donor countries in the form of manpower training programs and 
other spin-offs. Similarly technology transfer can also take place through the 
technical assistance programs of international or multilateral aid agencies, such as 
the various specialized agencies of the United Nations (UNDP, UNIDO, etc.) and 
the World Bank. Another interesting case of international technology transfer has 
been the unique historical experience of Japan where copying, through the 
imports and disassembly of machinery and equipment, was also one of the 
important ways in which Japan was able to acquire new industrial technology 
(Hill & Johns 1983: 62). 
     In considering the case of transfer of technology from Japan to Indonesia 
the most relevant cases of this transfer has been those of Japanese direct 
investment in Indonesia, technical licensing agreements between Japanese and 
Indonesian firms, and technical assistance programs provided by the Japanese 
government to Indonesia. Before discussing these various ways of technology 
transfer, however, it is important to bear in mind that there are several levels of 
industrial technological capability. This distinction is important in order to assess 
to what extent international technology transfer has contributed to the 
development of local technological capabilities. For our purposes we will use the 
following types or levels of capability as used by two Thai economists in their 
study on the technological capability of a number of Thai manufacturing 
industries (Kritayakirana & Srichandr 1989:6). 
 1. Operative capability, which includes the ability for efficient operation and 
   control of machinery and other equipment as well as their maintenance, 
   skill development through training, general management, production 
   planning, and quality control; 
 2. Acquisitive capability refers to a manufacturing firm's ability to search, 
   assess, negotiate, and procure relevant technologies as well as transfer 
   operational know-how and install and start up plants; 
 3. Adaptive capability is the ability to acquire knowledge, digest technology, 
   and conduct minor product and process modifications;
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 4. Innovative capability is the ability of a firm to carry out in-house research 
   and development, make major or radical product and process 
   modifications, and invent new products and/or processes. 
     In general, the above four levels of technological capability indicate the 
various steps in the order in which technological capability can be achieved by a 
manufacturing company. Hence, in the course of developing its technological 
capability, the relatively easiest level of capability to master is usually the 
operative capability followed by the acquisitive and adaptive capability. Not 
many firms, particularly in developing countries, are able to achieve innovative 
capability, which can only be achieved with a determined technological effort.
3. Japanese Investment in Indonesian Manufacturing
In terms of equity investments, foreign companies in general play a relatively 
modest role in Indonesian manufacturing. Excluding the very large oil and gas 
processing operations, foreign firms as a group accounted for only 16.7% of total 
manufacturing value added in 198 5, and for an even smaller 12.4% if these oil and 
gas processing facilities are included (Hill 1992: 232). This relatively low 
significance of foreign firms can be attributed to the large importance of staged 
enterprises (SOEs) in Indonesia's manufacturing sector and the highly regulatory 
investment regime which has governed investment activities for much of the High 
Order era, except for the short period after the enactment of the Foreign 
Investment Law in 1967 and the period since 1986 when the Indonesian 
government again began to relax its restrictive policies towards foreign 
investment. 
     While American companies are dominant in the oil sector, Japanese 
companies are by far the most important investors in the non-oil sector, 
particularly in the (non-oil) manufacturing sector. The data in Table 1 show that in 
terms of realized investment Japanese companies as a group are indeed by far the 
dominant investors in Indonesia's manufacturing sector, accounting for almost 
60% of total realized foreign investment in this sector. As a group, the second 
largest group of foreign investors in this sector are the European countries (13%), 
the Asian NICs (7.5%), and the U. S. (4%). 
     The data in Table 1 also show that Japanese investors are the dominant 
investors in several industries, namely the basic metals industry (85%), the textile 
industry (61%), and the metal goods industry (61%). Moreover, Japanese 
investment is also significant in the non-metallic minerals industry (48%) and the 
food industry (33%). The only industry in which Japanese investment is negligible 
is the paper and paper products industry (4%0).
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              Table 1. 
   Japanese cumulative realised investment, 
in Indonesian manufacturing, 1967-31 March 19911 
               (millions of US$)
Industry Japan
East
Asian
NICs 2
USA Europe 3 Australia Others 4 Total
1. Food 70.0
(33.1)
51.9 8.0 68.2 5.8 7.9 211.8
(100.0)
2. Textiles &
textile products
399.0
(61.1)
94.4 .4 15.4 143.3 652.5
(100.0)
3. Wood and wood
products
12.9
(20.4)
47.6 .9 1.8 63.2
(100.0)
4. Paper & paper
product
3.3
(4.2)
37.0 1.9 26.8 10.3 79.3
(100.0)
5. Chemicals 110.6
(16.0)
76.2 108.8 135.0 16.2 246.1 692.9
(100.0)
6. Non-metallic
minerals
238.5
(47.5)
2.8 16.4 8.6 3.3 232.7 501.7
(100.0)
7. Basic metals 1,551.9
(84.7)
4.0 255.3 4.8 17.2 1,833.2
(100.0)
8. Metal goods 246.2
(60.7)
15.9 39.6 71.4 1.2 31.2 405.5
(100.0)
9. Other
manufacturing
1.8
(19.4)
3.1 3.4 .9 9.3
(100.0)
Total 2,634.2
(59.2)
332.9
(7.5)
176.0
(4.0)
585.4
(13.2)
31.3
(0.7)
689.5
(15.5)
4,449.4
(100.0)
Notes : General note: Figures between brackets denote percentage. 
        1. Realised investment includes realised equity investment and foreign loans. 
       2. East Asian NICs include Korea, Taiwan, Hon g Kong and Singapore. 
       3. Europe includes the EC (European Community) and non-EC countries. 
        4. Others includes all other countries and investments by more than one country 
       (combined countries). 
Source : Bank Indonesia : Penanaman Modal Asing dari Tahun 1967 s/d 31 Maret 1991 [Foreign 
                   Investment from 1967 through 31 March 1991] (Jakarta 1992) 12-16.
     Actual Japanese direct investment in Indonesian manufacturing is even 
larger if their investment in the "combined countries" category (included in the 
"other" column in Table 1) is included. This category includes investments by
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firms from more than one home country. Unfortunately, the Indonesian official 
data do not present a detailed specification of the Japanese share in this category, 
although we can safely assume that Japanese investment in this category is quite 
important. 
     The data in Table 1 understate the Japanese commercial presence in another 
way, as Indonesia's automotive industry (included in the metal goods industry) in 
which foreign direct investment is prohibited, is highly dependent on the product 
and process technologies provided by Japanese automotive firms through 
technical licensing agreements (Hill 1988: 50). In view of the great importance of 
Japanese direct investment in Indonesian manufacturing, a keen observer of 
foreign investment in Indonesia noted that foreign investment in Indonesian 
manufacturing since the enactment of the Foreign Investment Law in 1967 can be 
described as basically Japanese investment (Hill 1988: 59-60). 
     Japanese direct investment came to Indonesia (and the other Southeast 
Asian countries) in two waves, namely during the so-called 'old' wave from the 
late 1950's up to 1985, and more recently in the 'new' wave since the substantial 
yen appreciation (endeka) of 1985 (Phongpaichit 1990: 29). 
     During this 'old' wave, much of Japan's export-oriented investment went to 
the East Asian countries which later became the NICs, while import-substitution 
and resource-oriented investment went to the Southeast Asian countries, 
particularly to resource-rich Indonesia. Japanese investment in Indonesian 
manufacturing started on a modest scale in 1968 at a time when, as noted earlier, 
Indonesia's manufacturing was still relatively underdeveloped-compared to the 
other large Southeast Asian countries, namely Thailand and the Philippines. 
During the first three years Japanese investment in Indonesia increased only 
slightly, but in 1971 started rising more rapidly so that by early 1972 Japanese 
investment in Indonesian manufacturing was already bigger than in Thai 
manufacturing (Yoshihara 1978:67). 
     Most of the Japanese investments in Indonesian manufacturing during the 
early 1970's was focused on the textile industry (primarily in synthetic fibres and 
integrated textile mills), construction materials (non-metallic minerals), 
agricultural inputs, resource-processing activities, transportation machinery 
(excluding ships), and electrical machinery (Yoshihara 1978: 67). Many of these 
industries, such as the textile, processed steel, consumer electronics, and metal 
products industries, can be classified as relatively labour-intensive industries in 
which Japan, since the early 1960's, had been losing its comparative advantage 
because of rapidly rising labour as well as land costs (Thee 1984: 99). 
     As noted above, the bulk of the 'old' wave of Japanese investment in 
Indonesian manufacturing has been of the import substitution type of investment.
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In a study conducted by a team of Indonesian economists in the late 1970's, a large 
majority of Japanese firms surveyed (81%) stated that they had come to Indonesia 
primarily for the purpose of producing finished goods for the domestic market 
(Siahaan, Thee, et. al. 1978: 99). 
     A later study conducted in the mid 1980's on Japanese investment in 
Indonesian manufacturing confirmed that it was still overwhelmingly oriented 
towards the domestic market, as indicated by the fact that of the 113 affiliates, not 
less than 105 or 93% of the total were import-substitution projects (Kinoshita 1985: 
21). 
     A 'new' wave of Japanese direct investment into Southeast Asia, including 
Indonesia, took place after the steep yen appreciation in 1985. Unlike the 'old' 
wave of mostly import-substituting investment, much of the 'new' wave of 
Japanese investment was taking place in export-oriented projects. While the steep 
yen appreciation of 1985 was indeed the direct cause for why many Japanese 
firms, including may small- and medium-scale firms, felt the need to relocate their 
operations overseas, the real underlying forces at work in Japan have been the 
transformation of the Japanese economy from an industrial country relying on 
labour-intensive manufactured exports into a more technology-intensive economy 
(Phongpaichit 1990: 29-34). 
     The need for many Japanese companies to relocate their labour-intensive 
operations to lower-cost sites in Southeast Asia after the 1985 yen appreciation 
coincided with the increasing shift to export-oriented industrialization policies of 
the South-east Asian countries, notably in Indonesia. While Indonesia's 
investment climate until the mid 1980's was still being perceived as less attractive 
to foreign investors, compared to Thailand and Malaysia, a series of deregulation 
packages introduced by the Indonesian government to drastically simplify the 
cumbersome investment licensing procedures considerably improved the 
investment climate. As a result, foreign investment, notably Japanese and Asian 
NICs' investment, began to increase very rapidly from 1987. 
     The data in Table 2 show that the 'new' wave of Japanese investment after 
1985 did not come to Indonesia immediately as it did to Thailand. However, as 
further deregulation measures and trade and industrial policy reforms to reduce 
the 'anti'-export bias of Indonesia's highly protectionist trade regime were 
introduced in the course of the late 1980's, more and more Japanese investment 
flowed into the country, much of it in export-oriented projects.
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Table 2. Approved Japanese Direct Investment in Indonesian Manufacturing, 
                         1968-1991
Year
Approved Investment
No. of Projects Newly Approved Amount
(millions of US $)
1968 3 4.2
1969 8 20.5
1970 20 27.9
1971 18 101.3
1972 13 55.7
1973 33 216.9
1974 22 399.1
1975 12 907.8
1976 5 32.7
1977 6 29.4
1978 7 26.2
1979 1 10.1
1980 4 28.8
1981 4 74.8
1982 11 532.2
1983 11 421.0
1984 2 31.1
1985 6 57.9
1986 5 232.9
1987 14 212.4
1988 14 121.3
1989 46 1,913.4
1990 48 976.6
1991 62 781.7
Source: JETRO: List of Japanese Investment projects in Indonesia, 1991 
            JETRO Jakarta Center (Jakarta April 1992)312-316.
     The expansion of new Japanese investment in Southeast Asia, including 
Indonesia, after 1985 has been characterized by the strong presence of companies 
from the various machinery industries, including general machinery, electric 
machinery, and transport equipment (Tran 1990: 88). This shift in the pattern of 
Japanese investment, reflecting Japan's shift in comparative advantage from 
relatively labour-intensive, low or medium-technology to more capital-intensive, 
high technology industries, is indicated by the data in Table 3.
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Table 3. Japanese Investment in Indonesian Manufacturing 
  By Intensity and Type of Technology, 1970 and 1991
Intensity and Type of
Technology in Industry
Number of Projects
1970 1991
a. Low Technology Industries
1.Food and Beverages
2. Textiles
2
5
3
16
b. Medium Technology Industries
1. Basic Metals and Products 2
c. High Technology Industries
1. Chemicals
2. Metal Goods
(Electrical Goods & Machinery)
1
5
11
22
Source: JETRO List of Japanese Investment Projects in Indonesia, 1991 JETRO 
Jakarta Center (Jakarta 1992) 213-216.
    Following the same classification of industries by the intensity and type of 
industrial technology, as used by Luis Wells (Wells 1983: 44), the data in Table 3 
show that while in 1971 a slightly larger number of Japanese projects were in the 
'low technology' industries, and by 1991 the bulk of Japanese investment projects 
was located in the 'high technology' industries.' This observation, though needs 
to be qualified, as Wells' classification was based on the proportion of R & D 
expenditures of manufacturing industries in the U. S. in the late 1970's rather than 
on the actual observation of process technologies being used in the various 
manufacturing industries in Indonesia. Moreover, the various categories of 
industries used by Wells were also highly aggregated, which did not make any 
distinction between the different levels and types of technologies being used in the 
various sub-sectors of an industry. A case in point would be the textile industry, 
where highly capital- and technology-intensive technologies are being used in the 
upstream synthetic fibre industry, whereas the downstream garment industry 
generally employs labour-intensive, low technologies. Wells' classification, based 
on developments in the mid 1970's, also could not take account of more recent 
technological developments in the garment sector in the developed countries 
which in the pre- and post-assembly stages of production have witnessed the 
increasing adoption of micro-electronics related innovations (MRIs) which has
1 Louis Wells defined 'low technology' industries as those industries where the industries' 
expenditures on R & D in the U. S. were less than one (1) percent of the sales of those industries. In 
'medium-technology' industries R & D expenditures in the U.S. ranged between 1 to 2.5% of sales, 
while in the 'high technology' industries R & D expenditures were in excess of 2.5% of the 
industries' sales. Luis T. Wells Third World Multinationals (Cambridge, Mass. 1983) 45.
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made this subsector an increasingly technologically sophisticated industry. With 
these qualifications in mind, the data in Table 3 nevertheless do show that in 1991, 
unlike twenty years earlier, the Japanese investment in Indonesia was largely 
concentrated in the high-technology industries. On the other hand, the large 
number of new Japanese projects in the textile industry does not mean that these 
investments were 'low technology' operations, as they have taken place in the 
technology-intensive upstream and mid-stream (spinning, weaving, and finishing) 
subsectors of the industry rather than in the more labour-intensive, low 
technology garment industry. As such, the recent new Japanese investments in 
Indonesian manufacturing are obviously making an important contribution to the 
modernization and increasing technological sophistication and export-orientation 
of Indonesia's manufacturing sector. 
     The recent Japanese investments in various modern, technology-intensive, 
export-oriented operations, notably in the electronics industry, have involved the 
establishment of modern new plants with state-of-the-art capital equipment and 
machinery, much of it highly automated. Following Chee and Lee (1979: 40), this 
transfer of modern machinery and equipment can be described as one major 
channel for the transfer of modern industrial technology from Japan to Indonesia. 
While this is undoubtedly true, a more pertinent question would be whether or 
not this type of direct investment and technology transfer is making a substantial 
contribution to the development of indigenous technological capability? Equally 
important, have these new Japanese investments also led to a consumensurate 
increase of the other forms of technology transfer, notably the transfer of technical 
skills and technological know-how to Indonesian nationals? Before discussing 
this issue, however, Japan's official, technical assistance program to Indonesia will 
be discussed, as this program also contains a technology transfer component.
4. Japan's Technical Assistance to Indonesia
     The Japanese government's overseas development assistance program puts 
a particular emphasis on the importance of technology transfer. Its stated policy 
in this regard is that Japan's official development assistance (ODA) should 
contribute to the ultimate self-reliance of the receiving countries. To this end, the 
development of the human resources of the developing countries through the 
transfer of technology is to be given particular emphasis in the effort to promote 
this self-reliance (Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund 1987: 1). 
     An important part of Japan's ODA is provided through technical assistance 
to the developing countries. This technical assistance focuses on the 'software' 
aspects of the various needs of the recipient countries, and technical cooperation is
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therefore targeted toward the development of the human resources of the 
recipient countries. This is to be achieved by imparting Japanese technology, 
including industrial technology, and know-how to a core group of local staff who 
play a guiding role in their respective fields in the developing countries. In 
technical assistance jargon, these local staff are known as 'counterparts'. Japan's 
stated goal of its technical assistance program is to contribute to the progress of 
the developing countries by using those 'counterparts' as interfaces to spread 
technology throughout these developing countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
1992:81). 
     Most government-to-government technical assistance under inter-
governmental agreements is implemented through the official Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA). Japan's official technical assistance program is 
provided in various forms through various projects. Japan's official technical 
assistance program for Indonesia started in 1969, and was initially administered 
by the Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency (OTCA). In 1974 this Agency was 
subsequently reorganized into the present Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA), which has since then been administering Japan's official technical 
assistance to Indonesia. 
     However, among JICA's various technical assistance projects in Indonesia, 
only a very few involve some form of the transfer of industrial technology and 
skills. Among these one should mention the establishment of the Electronic 
Engineering Polytechnic Institute of Surabaya (Politeknik Elektronika Surabaya or 
PES) in 1988. The purpose of establishing this polytechnic institute was to train 
Indonesian students to become practical field engineers in the field of electronics 
who could upon graduation work in the electronics and telecommunication 
industries (JICA 1992: 2). 
     Other JICA projects providing the transfer of industrial technology and 
skills to Indonesia include the Chemical Industry Training Development Centre in 
Medan, North Sumatra, (which provides training to students planning to work in 
chemical industries), the Sulawesi Industrial Vocational Training Centre in Ujung 
Pandang, South Sulawesi, and the CEVEST Vocational Training Development 
Project, (Japan International Cooperation Agency 1991/92: 2-3). 
     The CEVEST Vocational Training Development Project located in Bekasi, 
West Java, now in its second phase and running from January 1, 1992 through 
March 31,1997, and conducted in cooperation with the Department of Manpower, 
provides an interesting example of the kind of technological assistance provided 
by Japan to Indonesia under which Japanese instructors sent to Indonesia train 
their local counterparts, namely the Indonesian instructors, with a view to 
upgrade their expertise in the fields of industrial electronics and information
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processing at the Diploma III level. Upon completion of these training courses, 
the Indonesian instructors will themselves teach the courses in these fields. 
Another objective of the CEVEST Project is the establishment of a training system 
to up-grade the technical skills of personnel (skill-upgrading training) working in 
the fields of machining, electricity, and electronics. 
    The CEVEST Project thus provides an appropriate example of how 
industrial technologies are being transferred from Japan to Indonesia through 
official channels, that is through Japan's official technical assistance to Indonesia. 
In view of Indonesia's relatively narrow base of industrial skills, JICA's support of 
the above polytechnic institute and the various vocational training centers meets 
an obvious need of Indonesia to expand and upgrade the numbers of highly 
skilled industrial workers. The great need for such polytechnic institutes and 
vocational training centers is at present already becoming quite evident, as the 
shortage of highly skilled industrial engineers, technical experts, and industrial 
workers, together with inadequate physical infrastructure, are already becoming 
serious constraints to Indonesia's further industrial growth. 
     In view of Indonesia's obvious need to expand its narrow industrial skills 
base, an expansion of the type of technical assistance provided by JICA would be 
most opportune, particularly as Japan has the necessary financial resources to 
expand such a technical assistance program. However, in expanding such a 
technical assistance program within a short time, JICA might run into some 
problems. For instance, Japanese technical experts sometimes tend to be weak in 
foreign languages. At a more general policy level, the Japanese government 
appears not to have taken the necessary long-term measures for building up a 
large pool of technical experts (Rix 1990: 26-27). This problem, however, should 
not be too difficult to overcome in view of Japan's very large pool of technical 
experts in the private sector who could be persuaded to work in JICA's technical 
assistance programs, if JICA manages to arrange a cooperation program with the 
private sector (Yamashita 1992: 27).
5. Technology Transfer through the Private Sector
5.1. Contrasting Views on Technology Transfer through Japanese TNCs 
As noted earlier, industrial technologies can be transferred from one private firm 
to another firm located in another country, either through foreign direct 
investment (FDI) or through technical licensing agreements without any equity 
participation. In the case of the transfer of industrial technologies from Japan to 
developing countries, including Indonesia, there appears to be what a Japanese
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economist has described as a 'recognition gap' between the donor country (i.e. 
Japan) and the recipient countries, including Indonesia. In the case of Southeast 
Asia, including Indonesia, this 'recognition gap' arises from the fact that many 
government officials, engineers, and economists in these countries believe that 
Japanese-affiliated firms operating in these countries are often unwilling to carry 
out technology transfer to nationals in these host countries, at least if compared to 
the practices of U.S. and European firms (Yamashita 1992: 6). Conversely, 
Japanese entrepreneurs and technical experts attached to these Japanese-affiliated 
firms often tend to be surprised hearing these critics, as they firmly believe that 
they not only conducted technology transfer to the local employees in a thorough 
way, but also in a way better suited to the long-term needs of the developing 
country. 
     In the case of Indonesia, the views expressed by Mr. A. R. Soehoed, 
Minister of Industry during the period 1978-1983, on the transfer of technology 
through transnational corporations (TNCs) is quite representative of views 
generally held in the country regarding the performance in technology transfer of 
Japanese TNCs operating in Indonesia. Discussing the experience of Japanese 
investment projects in Indonesia's textile industry, particularly in the synthetic 
fibre industry, Soehoed stated that the speed of technology transfer in these 
projects were quite slow. Whatever technology transfer has taken place has mainly 
taken the form of training and employment of machine operators (Soehoed 1981: 
135). Soehoed attributed the slow process, even reluctance, to transfer technology, 
in the Japanese controlled textile firms, to the Japanese concept of lifetime 
employment which demands loyalty from the employees. The problem in 
Indonesia, of course, was that the turnover rate in Indonesia can be quite high 
(Soehoed 1981: 135). It may thus not pay the Japanese to train their Indonesian 
technical staff and employees thoroughly, if the latter leave the Japanese company 
for another company. 
    Soehoed acknowledged, though, that the transfer of technology from 
Japanese to Indonesian nationals in the transport and heavy equipment industry 
was a bit more intensive. This was evident from the fact that Indonesian nationals 
working in the Japanese-controlled firms in these industries had been entrusted 
with carrying out modifications in design engineering and in the production 
process. However, Soehoed pointed out that these industries were still in the 
assembling stage.2 This implied that other activities, such as material selection,
2 It should be pointed out that Soehoed expressed these views in 1980 at a time when the so-
called 'deletion program' (local content program) for the various engineering goods industries had 
just started. Since then, however, Indonesian manufacturing industries have made more rapid 
progress in mastering industrial technologies.
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material balance, and manufacturing technology was still determined by the 
parent companies in Japan, and that important activities, such as production 
management, procurement, logistics, quality control, inspection, and testing 
analysis were still carried out by the Japanese expatriates rather than by the 
Indonesia staff (Soehoed 1981: 136). 
     The criticisms level led at Japanese, affiliated in developing countries, for 
not carrying out technology transfer or for not carrying it out at a faster pace is 
often based on comparisons with the practices of American or European firms. 
For instance, Soehoed argued that American and European TNCs operating in 
Indonesia operating under the broad policy of their head-quarters appeared to 
transfer as many skills as possible and as quickly as possible to the Indonesian 
nationals. He attributed this to the fact that the technologies in use may have 
already been known or may have been embodied in the capital equipment. 
Another likely reason was the high costs of maintaining expatriates (Soehoed 
1981: 136). Be that as it may, the result has been that several European or 
American firms have given Indonesian nationals important executive positions 
and allowed them to carry out important strategic functions, such as production 
planning, process engineering, product design, and quality control. In addition, 
several of these firms have also been very active in recruiting Indonesian nationals 
for these strategic posts (Soehoed 1981: 136). 
     Unlike the American and European companies, the Japanese companies 
tend to keep their expatriate experts for a much longer time. For this reason 
Japanese firms are often criticized for being unwilling or tardy in transferring their 
technology and skills. As many Japanese managers themselves acknowledge that 
they tend to keep their technical experts for a longer time, it is important to know 
the reasons which they advance to justify their practices. In general, Japanese 
manufacturing companies tend to base their production management methods, 
and particularly their technical training on on-the-job training (OJT). Instead of 
relying on detailed job descriptions, as is the case with Western firms, in Japanese 
firms the workers generally lack detailed job descriptions and work standards. 
Instead, these firms tend to rely more on-the-job training or on the knowledge and 
experience of the Japanese technical experts (Yamashita 1992: 7). 
     The reason why Japanese technical experts tend to stay longer in the 
Japanese-affiliated companies is that these experts stay on, even after having 
trained the local employees in running competently the basic operations in the 
factory, with the purpose of training the local workers step-by-step in 
maintenance and repair, quality control, and in introduction of new methods and 
technology. The need for training local employees beyond the level of basic 
operations is considered important, as Japanese companies attach great
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importance to the firm's ability to respond quickly to changes in model design, 
production methods, materials, and new product development (Yamashita 1992: 
7-8). While this ability to respond quickly to external changes was not so urgent 
for Indonesia-based firms during the period of import-substituting 
industrialization of the 1970's and early 1980's, the need for it became much more 
urgent when Indonesia began to shift to export-oriented industrialization in the 
mid-1980's.
5.2. Training by Japanese Firms: An Overview of Some Research Findings 
If training, particularly on-the-job training, is indeed an important element in the 
technology transfer from Japan to Indonesia, has this training been effective? In a 
survey conducted by Professor Tsurumi, in 1973, of 74 Japanese firms operating in 
Indonesia, it was found that the productivity levels of the Indonesian workers at 
the outset of the operations were only 50 to 60% of Japanese or Korean workers in 
comparable industries. However, after 12 to 18 months of work experience and 
closely supervised training, the Indonesian workers were able to achieve 80 to 
90% of this level (quoted in Hill 1988: 124). 
     That Japanese firms indeed put an emphasis on training their local 
workers is indicated by the findings of a survey conducted in 1978 by this author 
and his colleagues on the operations of 23 Japanese-controlled manufacturing 
firms in Indonesia. The data in Table 4 show the number of Indonesian workers at 
all level of operations who were provided with various kinds of training 
opportunities within these Japanese companies. 
    The data in the table below indicate that training opportunities with the 23 
sample firms were quite extensive, particularly on-the-job training. These findings 
suggest that Japanese firms indeed put a great emphasis on-the-job training. The 
data in Table 4 also show that training opportunities at company headquarters 
and other training opportunities, particularly for the plant workers, were quite 
significant too. Training at the company headquarters in Japan appeared to be 
particularly important for middle-level managers as well as plant supervisors, 
while on-the-job training was important for all levels, from middle-level managers 
down to plant supervisors and plant workers (Siahaan, et. al. 1978: 114-116). 
     A more recent case study conducted by Professor Ikuro Yamamoto of 
KinjOgakuin University, Nagoya, on skill formation in a Japanese-affiliated firm 
manufacturing motor vehicle bodies in Indonesia, also found that on on-the-job 
training is accorded high priority right from the start of the employment of a new 
worker. A newly-recruited worker learns from the start to operate one of the 
machines in the production section under the instruction of a group leader or
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Table 4. Average length of time of training programs of selected Japanese firms 
                             (number of months)
Position On-the-job 
Training
Training at 
Company 
HQ in Japan
Training at 
Japanese 
Univ. or 
Institute
Training at 
Indonesian 
Univ. or 
Institute
Other 
Programs
Upper 
management 
Middle 
management 
Office 
workers 
Plant 
supervisors 
Laborers
12
3 - 24
3 - 6
2 - 12
1 /2 - 12
3/4 - 1
1/2 - 5
1/2 - 4
3/4 - 6
9 - 18
1
1
12
1 /4 - 12
3 - 12
2 - 3
1 /4 - 6
1/2 - 30
1 /2 - 60
1 - 4
2 - 6
1 - 3
Source: Luckman Siahaan, Thee Kian Wie, Ahmad Hamid, J. L. Tamba Japanese Direct Investment 
in Indonesia-Findings of an Experimental Survey (Tokyol978) 68, Table 4.3. Derived from 
experimental survey returns.
senior worker (Yamamoto 1988: 101-109). The most notable feature of skill 
formation in the production section of the plant, that is the section where the 
motor vehicle body is being assembled, is that workers acquire wider abilities to 
operate various machines through job rotation within the work-place. This 
rotation is decided by the section chief after consultation with the foremen and the 
group leaders. The purpose of job rotation is to extend the range of skills of the 
workers, to improve teamwork, and to relieve the monotony of work. After a 
while the newly-employed workers are rotated from the small press shop to the 
big one. In this way workers after a few years acquire the ability to operate almost 
all the different machines in the press shop (Yamamoto 1988: 104). 
     The findings of the three above surveys indicate first, that Japanese firms 
indeed provide numerous training opportunities, notably on-the-job training, for 
their Indonesian employees, and secondly, that as a result, their productivity 
levels have increased appreciably. To the extent that some of these Indonesian 
managers, technical experts, and workers have moved to Indonesian companies, 
favorable technological spill-overs have taken place as a result of the presence of 
thesetJapanese firms. 
     A more recent comparative study by Professor Tran Van Tho, Obirin 
University, Tokyo, on technology transfer in Japanese firms in the synthetic fibre 
industry in South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Indonesia has yielded some 
interesting findings on the efficiency of technology transfer by Japanese firms. To 
assess the progress in technology transfer, Tran divided the whole transfer process 
into three levels, namely:
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  1. The transfer of production technology; 
  2. The transfer of administration technology; 
  3. The transfer of management know-how (Tran 1990: 78). 
     The transfer of production technology involves the transfer of equipment as 
well as the knowledge and methods to operate them. This requires training the 
local plant workers to operate the machines and other capital equipment. The 
transfer of administration technology involves the training and education of the 
local engineers and middle-level managers to carry out various administration 
functions, such as inventory management, quality control, schedule control, and 
facility administration in order that the Japanese-affiliated firm can be run 
efficiently. The third level of technology is the management know-how which lies 
with the headquarters of the parent company in Japan. At the headquarters the 
overall management of the operations of the various plants is being conducted as 
well as the company strategies concerning planning, marketing, finance, R & D, 
and other strategic issues. Obviously, the transfer of such management skills and 
know-how is quite difficult, as these top-level managers must not only have high 
levels of managerial know-how to run the local subsidiary, but must also be aware 
of the global strategy of the parent company (Tran 1990: 80). Tran found that in 
regard to production and administration technologies, the Japanese-affiliated 
firms in the synthetic fibre industry in Thailand and Indonesia have been quite 
successful in transferring these two levels of technologies to respectively the local 
plant workers and local managers, This was generally achieved by on-the-job 
training for the local operators and by sending the middle-level managers to Japan 
for training courses. On the other hand, in regard to management know-how, the 
transfer to local personnel did not show any significant progress. Hence, while in 
several Japanese-affiliated firms, local middle-level managers have replaced the 
Japanese managers, this has not been the case with the top management levels 
(Tran 1990: 86). 
     Tran found a certain reluctance on the part of the Japanese firms to fill the 
top management positions with local managers as this might cause difficulties in 
the communications with the company's headquarters in view of language 
problems. Another factor militating against the promotion of local staff to the top 
positions was that promotion in Japanese firms is based on the seniority system. 
This implies that it would take a new employee about twenty years or more to 
achieve a high managerial post. Japanese firms also pointed out that in many 
developing countries, including Indonesia and Thailand, a serious shortage exists 
of qualified high-level managers (Tran 1990: 86-87).
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6. Conclusion
     The findings of Professor Tran appear to vindicate the perception of many 
Indonesians that there is a limit to what they can expect from Japanese companies 
in terms of technology transfer. While a considerable transfer of industrial 
technology from Japan to Indonesia has undoubtedly taken place, still is taking 
place, and will still take place in the foreseeable future because of the very large 
presence of Japanese companies in Indonesia's manufacturing sector, the 
important lesson from Indonesia's experience as well as the experience of other 
developing countries with foreign, including Japanese, investment is that foreign 
direct investment provides no simple short-cut to the acquisition of indigenous 
technological capability. In fact, Japan's and a few decades later (South) Korea's 
experience show that rapid industrial progress and the acquisition of indigenous 
technological capability was not dependent on foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Even though FDI did play a role in some fields of industrial activity in these two 
East Asian countries, their role was never dominant and in many ways quite 
restricted. 
     Korea's rapid industrialization during the past three decades has always 
been directed and controlled by the Koreans themselves. While foreign resources 
have made substantial contributions to Korea's rapid economic development, the 
economic transactions involved have generally been at arm's length. Although 
Korea did rely on substantial capital inflows, these flowed in the form of loans 
rather than as foreign direct investment. Consequently, industrial technologies 
were largely acquired from abroad through other means rather than through FDI. 
Initially, foreign process technologies were purchased from abroad through 
technical licensing agreements. Later, however, greater reliance was put on 
machinery imports and turnkey projects to transfer industrial technologies to 
Korea. In addition, a considerable amount of technological knowledge was 
acquired as Korean engineers and scientists returned home after having studied or 
worked overseas, particularly in the U.S. (Dahlman & Westphal 1982: 127). Over 
time further indigenous technological development was promoted through the 
huge investments which the Korean industrial conglomerates (chaebol) made in R 
& D, which in turn was supported by a good educational infrastructure and a 
strong domestic science and technology infrastructure. 
     It might be incumbent upon Indonesia, particularly Indonesia's indigenous 
manufacturing firms, to take Korea's experience to heart and to put in a greater 
effort to invest in the acquisition of indigenous technological capability. This 
would not mean that FDI, including Japanese FDI, should not be welcomed to 
Indonesia. In fact, Japanese FDI has contributed and is still contributing a great
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deal to Indonesia's rapid industrial development and transformation. In terms of 
technology transfer, Japanese FDI has, as we have seen from the above overview 
of research findings, also contributed a great deal to the acquisition of the 'easier' 
technological capabilities, notably the operative and adaptive ability. It should, 
however, also be clear that FDI in general, including Japanese FDI, cannot be 
relied upon to transfer acquisitive, let alone innovative capabilities to local firms, 
For these capabilities there is no shortcut to indigenous technological effort to 
acquire domestic technological capability. 
     Hence, rather than engaging in a rather fruitless effort to criticize Japanese 
firms, continually for their failure or unwillingness to transfer advanced 
technologies to Indonesia, it might be a more productive exercise to maximize the 
benefits from Japanese FDI in Indonesia by encouraging the Japanese firms to 
transfer the operative and adaptive capabilities to Indonesian nationals in an 
optimal way. As pointed out earlier, technological diffusion would take place if 
some of these Indonesian employees, after having acquired these technological 
capabilities, leave their jobs with the Japanese firms to move to Indonesian 
national firms. To the extent that this occurs, Japanese FDI undoubtedly yields 
positive external benefits to the Indonesian economy. To expect more from 
Japanese FDI, however, particularly to expect that it would freely transfer its 
innovative capabilities to Indonesian nationals, would be naive as this would 
never happen. In many fields Japanese manufacturing firms gained their 
competitive edge by continually strengthening their owner-specific advantages in 
technology. To expect that these firms, or any other foreign firm for that matter, 
would freely make these advanced technologies available would be futile, as new 
technologies, in contrast to 'mature' technologies, just cannot be purchased off-
the-shelf. 
     A recent study on technology transfer through TNCs in Indonesia indicated 
that the degree of local technological efforts is generally greater with Indonesian 
national companies which acquired their technologies through technical licensing 
agreements than in the case of joint ventures between TNCs and national firms, 
particularly when management control still lies with the TNC (Thee 1990: 228-
232). While Japanese firms have also transferred their technologies to Indonesian 
firms through these licensing agreements, Korea's experience, as noted above, has 
also indicated that this method may only be beneficial during a country's early 
industrial development. Over time, however, the Indonesian national firms 
should make their own technological effort to acquire more advanced 
technological capabilities. 
     In trying to achieve this goal, Indonesia should pay much greater attention 
than it has so far to the two major constraints which are currently hampering
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Indonesia's sustained industrial growth. The first is Indonesia's inadequate 
physical infrastructure, and the second, the shortage of well-educated human 
resources. While Indonesia has made rapid progress in its educational 
development over the past two decades, it still has, in comparison with Korea, a 
long way to go to attain the levels of secondary and tertiary education required to 
support technological development. After all, a prerequisite for technological 
development would be the availability of industrial engineers who can 
understand and assess the imported technologies (Kakazu 1990: 56). In other 
words, technology transfer from Japan to Indonesia cannot take place in a 
vacuum. While it would undoubtedly require a greater willingness and 
confidence on the part of Japanese firms to transfer their technology on a wider 
scale to Indonesian nationals, it would also require a very serious effort on the 
part of the Indonesian government in cooperation with the private sector to 
expand and upgrade the quality of the Indonesian educational system, with a 
view to increase the output of industrial engineers which at present is still far 
from adequate.
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